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Abstract 
 
We  focus  on  a  simple  framework  on  wheat  producer  behaviour  in  a  context  of  price  output 
uncertainty.  More  precisely,  we  establish  a  relationship  between  ex  post  output  price  level  and 
allocative inefficiency that allows to characterize farmers’ risk preferences. Given this analysis, the 
connection  between  risk  aversion  and  other  socioeconomic  variables  (such  as  degree  of  output 
specialisation,  total  asset,  debts,  farmer’s  age…)  can  furthermore  empirically  be  explored.  This 
relationship is empirically tested on an unbalanced panel including about 650 wheat producers located 
in the French Department of Meuse over 1992-2003. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Price uncertainty - a standard attribute of agricultural activities - is well known as being one of the 
causes of allocative inefficiency. Because of long production lags imposed by biological processes, the 
final output price is usually unknown ex ante when producers make decisions. In addition, several 
characteristics of agricultural markets - such as inelastic demand, homogenous output, large number of 
small competitive producers - generate high price volatility even in case of slight supply changes. By 
these means, production risk due to climatic conditions or pest infestations leads to price uncertainty. 
As an additional source of price uncertainty, agricultural policy can also play a significant role in farm 
operations. For instance with the recent successive CAP reforms, European farmers have experienced 
a transition from a high subsidised output price system to a less sheltered and more risky context 
(international market prices, gradual uncoupling of local subsidies from production, …). 
 
Models dealing with producer behaviour in a context of output price uncertainty are considered in 
Sandmo (1971) or Chambers (1983) while risk production analysis with stochastic technology have 
been developed by Just and Pope (1978) or Chambers and Quiggin (2002), among others. In the 
present  paper  we  focus  on  a  simple  framework  which associates  allocative  inefficiency  with risk 
preferences  when  producers  face  price  output  uncertainty.  More  precisely,  we  establish  that  a 
relationship  between  output  price  level  and  allocative  inefficiency  allows  to  characterize  risk 
preferences.  Given  this  analysis,  the  connection  between  risk  aversion  and  other  socioeconomic 
variables (such as degree of output specialisation, total asset, debts, farmer’s age…) can furthermore 
empirically be explored. 
 
A wide range of papers in agricultural economics investigated risks preferences.
1 One of the most 
interesting  conclusions  of  these  analyses  was  that  the  dispersion  of  risk  preferences  is  always 
significant even within relatively homogeneous groups of farmers. However, there are fewer empirical 
studies dealing with the joint estimation of technical or allocative inefficiency and risk aversion in the 
presence  of  output  price  uncertainty.  For  instance,  on  a  panel  of  28  Norwegian  salmon  farms, 
Kumbhakar  (2002)  showed  that  the  degree  of  risk  aversion  -  which  varied  substantially  across 
producers  and  time  -  might  bias  parameter  estimates  on  technology  (technical  change,  input 
elasticity…). Based on the old idea of an inverse relationship between price uncertainty and allocative 
efficiency  (Johnson,  1947),  Wu  (1979)  empirically  investigated  whether  farmers  allocate  their 
resources more efficiently when prices are less random. His results based on small scale of Taiwanese 
family farms strongly suggest that price and output uncertainty cause profit inefficiency. 
 
Our analysis goes beyond the commonly known connection between allocative inefficiency and price 
volatility. We develop a simple model that bridges allocative inefficiency and ex post output price 
levels to characterize producers’ risk aversion. This relationship is empirically tested on an unbalanced 
panel containing about six hundred wheat producers located in the French Department
2 of Meuse. The 
production technology  is defined  with  one  output (wheat  per  hectare) and three  inputs  (fertilizer, 
pesticide and seed) and the period of analysis (1992-2003) covers the two main CAP reforms. 
 
Some restrictive features of such a model must be noted. First, we assume that all farm operations are 
decided before the resolution of uncertainty. Second, opportunities of risk management strategies are 
not considered with a mono-output profit function. Actually, output shares depend on multiple and 
complex factors mainly related to relative price movements and crop rotations set by agronomical 
constraints which are undetected in our data. Although these effects might play an important role, such 
simplifications are necessary in a first attempt to measure the basic features of risk aversion. Unlike 
most empirical papers analyzing production choices under uncertainty, we favour a non parametric 
approach  to  estimate  the  allocative  inefficiency.  A  strength  of  our  approach  is  that  no  a  priori 
restrictive functional forms such as Cobb-Douglas or quadratic functions have to be specified  
 
                                                       
1 See G. Moschini and D.A. Hennessy (2001) for a review of selected empirical issues.  
2 Territorial administrative division. IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2008-ECO-2 
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This paper is structured as follows. The next section first offers an intuitive and graphical overview of 
the connection between allocative inefficiency and output price levels under different risk preferences. 
This relationship is then formally derived within a mean-variance framework. Section 3 introduces 
distance  functions  representing  technology  and  allowing  to  separate  technical  and  allocative 
components  from  overall  productive  inefficiency.  Section  4  discusses  the  sample,  presents  the 
empirical inefficiency scores, and tests the panel econometric model to characterize risk preferences of 
French wheat producers. Conclusions and extensions appear in Section 5. 
 
2. Linking allocative inefficiency and risk-aversion 
 
We first develop an intuitive and graphical overview of the connection between allocative inefficiency 
and output price levels under different risk preferences. In a second step, we formally derive the 
results within a mean-variance framework. 
 
2.1. A graphical overview 
Before embarking on a formal presentation of the models, we begin with graphical illustrations of our 
approach that links allocative inefficiency and risk-aversion. In Figure 1, the situation of a single input 
(x)/single output (y) farm displaying variable returns to scale (VRS) technology T(x,y) is depicted. The 
farmer has to make a decision on the optimal quantity of input/output in case he faces a known input 
price ( x p ) and a uniformly distributed output price ( y p ) over the interval [ 0 p ,  1 p ]. Allocations 
0 0 ( , ) x y  and  1 1 ( , ) x y  are the optimal solutions under certainty when the prices are respectively  0 p  
and  1 p . Under uncertainty and risk-neutrality, the farmer will chose the production plan  ( , ) rn rn x y  
corresponding to a shadow price equal to the mean output price  0 1 ( )/2 p p + .  
 
The choice of the production plan is ex ante and one output price ( y p % ) will be made at the end of the 
period. If  y p %  is different from the mean output price  0 1 ( )/2 p p +  then allocative inefficiency arises 
(Fig. 2). We notice that the allocative inefficiency increases if the achieved output price departs from 
the mean output price in both directions. Higher allocative inefficiency is expected for either high or 
low achieved price. We therefore do not expect, over an observed sample, the allocative inefficiency 
to be positively or negatively related to the realized output price under risk neutrality. 
 
The picture is different when risk aversion is taken into account (Fig. 3). A risk averse producer 
produces  less  output  than  the  risk  neutral  producer  since  he  does  not  like  the  loss  associated  to 
potential low achieved output prices. As for the risk neutral farmer, allocative inefficiency arises as far 
as the achieved output price departs from the shadow price at the ex ante chosen production plan. 
However, under the assumption of a uniform price distribution
3, the majority of observed output prices 
are likely to be higher than the shadow price. On a sample of risk averse farmers, it is therefore 
intuitive that the allocative inefficiency increases along with the achieved output price since risk-
aversion leads to lower output levels. Finally, Figure 4 illustrates the case of risk-loving producers. By 
symmetry to the risk aversion case, risk-loving farmers choose higher levels of output compared to 
risk neutral producers. Therefore, the allocative inefficiency increases (resp. decreases) along with 
decreasing (resp. increasing) achieved output price. 
 
As a conclusion, we have illustrated how the allocative inefficiency is related to the achieved output 
price  when  producers  choose  a  production  plan  under  price  uncertainty  and  exhibit different risk 
preferences. Therefore, on an observed sample, allocative inefficiencies are expected to be positively 
(resp. negatively, not) related to ex post output prices when producers are risk averse (resp. loving, 
neutral). 
 
                                                       
3 The uniform distribution assumption is too strong for our results and a symmetric distribution around the mean will 
suffice. IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2008-ECO-2 
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Figure 1. Choice of production under risk neutrality and price uncertainty 
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Figure 3. Allocative inefficiency for a risk averse producer under price uncertainty 
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2.2. A stylized model 
Beyond this intuitive graphical description we now formally derive the results within a mean-variance 
framework. We consider the following simple model. Farmers produce a single output ( y ) using a 
single input (x ). The production process they face displays variable (decreasing) returns to scale and 
is represented by the following concave function: y x = .  
 
The input and output markets are both considered as being competitive so that farmers take the price 
of the input ( x p ) and the price of the output ( y p ) as given. We suppose first that there is no risk 
surrounding  farmers’  decisions.  The  output  is  considered  as  being  their  decision  variable.  Their 
maximization  program  can  thus  be  written  as  follows  (where 





y x p y p y p = -  
 
Give this framework the output produced (
C y ) and the profit made ( ( )

















p = . 
 
Let us now introduce risk into the model. We suppose that the only risk farmers face is related to the 
price at which they sell the output once it is produced. The distribution of the price of the output is 
supposed to be continuous and uniform between  0 p  and  1 p . No other sources of risk (such as a 
technological risk) are considered.  
 
If farmers are risk neutral, their maximization program (where  ( )
RN E p  denotes the expected profit 
the farmers get in case of risk neutrality) can be written: 
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y x y p E p y p y dp
p p
p = -
- ∫  
 
The output produced under risk neutrality (denoted 












The output is different from the one produced under certainty only if the average expected price differs 
















We model farmers’ behaviour under risk using the mean-variance model. Given our assumptions, the 
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It is interesting to note that a higher output necessarily increases the variance of the profit farmers 
face. This makes clear that the most risk averse of them are less output prone. Indeed, in the mean 
variance model the evaluation of the profit distribution (denoted  ( )
RA V p ) is given by: 
 
2 2





V E k p p p y k p p p p s p = - = + - - -  
 
where  k  denotes farmers’ risk aversion since it expresses how much they dislike the variance of the 
distribution of the profit
4. A negative value of  k  indicates that farmers are risk lovers while they are 
risk neutral if  0 k =  (they only consider the mean profit when making decisions in that case). 
 
Farmers’ maximization program (where  ( )
RA V p  denotes the utility they get from their profit under 









V p p p y k p p p = + - - -  
 
The solution of this maximization problem gives the optimal value of the output (

















We notice that 
RA RN y y =  when farmers are risk neutral ( 0 k = ). The higher (resp. lower)  k  the 
lower (resp. higher) 
RA y  since  - as noticed earlier - a  lower (resp. higher) output reduces (resp. 
increases) the variance of the distribution of the profit which is - beside the mean profit - something 
that risk averse (resp. risk-loving) farmers appreciate. 
 
Let us define the shadow price of 
RA y  as the certain price that would lead farmers to the production of 
RA y  units of output. This shadow price is denoted 
SP


















The more risk averse producers are, the lower the output and therefore the lower the shadow price 









The allocative inefficiency ( AI ) is defined in our model as the difference between the profit made at 
the price  y p  under certainty (complete information) and the profit made at the same price  y p  in case 
the output decision is made under incomplete information i.e. before that price is known. 
 
2 2
0 1 0 1 2 2
2 2
0 1
(( ( ) 12 ) 6( ) )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) )
4 ( ( ) 12 )
x y x C C C RA C C RA RA
y x y x
x x
k p p p p p p p
AI y y p y p y p y p y
p k p p p
p p
- + - +
= - = - - - =
- +
 
                                                       
4 In the mean variance model the risk is only characterized by the variance of the distribution. Agents are therefore 
supposed not to care about the higher moments of the distribution (skewness, kurtosis,…). IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2008-ECO-2 
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Therefore we obtain  0 1 ( , , , , ) y x AI f p k p p p =  and we notice that allocative inefficiency is a quadratic 
function of the realized output price. 
 
This allocative inefficiency stems from two elements: the preference towards risk (aversion or love) 
and the misprediction of the average price. It can indeed be seen that there is no allocative inefficiency 
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It can be shown from this expression that the variation of the allocative inefficiency with the output 
price is directly related to the difference between the price farmers face ex post and the shadow price. 
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The intuition behind the figure is the following. If the price a single farmer faces turns out to be 
SP
y p , 
there is no inefficiency since the farmer has produced under incomplete information what he would 
have produced had the information been known. The more the price moves away (on both sides) from 
the shadow price, the higher the difference between the current output and the one that would have 
been produced under complete information and thus the higher the allocative inefficiency. 
 
We can infer farmers’ average risk aversion from our data and this theoretical analysis. If the price that 












 on average since the price falls more often above the shadow price than below. Using the 























¶ ∑  ⇒ The n farmers are risk lovers on average 
 






 could be 
negative for an individual farmer despite the fact that the shadow price is lower than the average 
expected price if the price this farmer faces is close to  0 p . 
 
The above analysis enables us to define whether the farmers (or some subgroups of farmers) taken 
from our sample are risk averse on average. It also enables us to compare the average risk aversion of 
some subgroups of farmers since: 
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 increases with risk aversion (k ). So that we can conclude that 
subgroups of farmers with a higher average risk aversion have lower average shadow prices and a 












) falls when risk 
love falls). 
 
3. Measuring allocative inefficiency using distance functions 
 
In section 2, we have presented both a graphical overview and a formal model to analyze the link 
between  allocative  inefficiency  and  output  price.  Notice  that  we  have  always  assumed  a  rational 
producer with choices on the frontier of the technology. However in the empirical work, to take into 
account heterogeneity and exogenous factors in farms’ production, we allow for technical inefficiency 
(producing below the frontier). We therefore need to compute the allocative inefficiency net of the 
technical inefficiency. The following non parametric framework allows for the estimation of both 
types of inefficiencies. 
 IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2008-ECO-2 
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Suppose  that  the  sector  under  analysis  is  populated  by  K  firms.  Let 
k N x R+ Î   and 
k M y R+ Î  
respectively  denote input and  output  vectors for firm  k  (k  =  1...,  K).  Let  T   be  a  production  set 
satisfying the core Shephard axioms (Shephard, 1953); in particular, we consider a convex technology 
T   satisfying  free  disposability  of  inputs  and  outputs.  As  noted  above,  we  adopt  the  standard 
assumption that all firms face the same technology, T. Under variable returns to scale, the firm level 





1 1, 0 1 ,
K




k k k k
n n
k k
T x y x R y R y z y m M





= , : Î , Î , ³ , = ,..., , 

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  (1) 
where xi and yj denote the i
th and j
th elements of x and y, respectively.  
 
Given the above technology definition, we now present the directional distance function which is used 
to  determine  the  inefficiency  in  the  technology  use.  The  function 
( ) ( )
N M N M
T D R R R R R + + + + + : ´ ´ - ´ ¾®
r
 defined by: 
  ( ) { } ( , ; ; ) sup : , , T x y x y D x y g g R x g y g T
l
l l l + = Î + × + × Î
r
  (2) 
is the directional distance function in the direction  ( ) ; x y g g . An analysis of the properties of the 
directional  distance  function  can  be  found  in  Chambers  et  al.  (1996).  Note  that 
( ) ( ) , ; ; 0 T x y x y T D x y g g , Î Ü⇒ ³
r
. Thus, the production set can be derived from the directional 
distance function. 
 
We use observed production plans as the direction of translation when computing inefficiency using 
the directional distance function (Briec, 1997); i.e.,  ( ) ( , ) ,
k k
x y g g x y = - , where k indexes firms. The 
technical  inefficiency  of  a  particular  firm  k  is  defined  by  ( ) , ; , ,
k k k k
T D x y x y -
r
  which  can  be 
computed by solving a linear program (LP).
5 For example, under the assumption of a variable return to 
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L   (3) 
 
We now turn to the definitions of profit and allocative inefficiencies. Let  ( )
M N p w R
+
+ , Î  denote an 
input-output price vector. The profit function is defined by:  
  { } ( ) sup ( )
x y
p w w y p x x y T
,
P , = . - . : , Î   (4) 
 
                                                       
5 The calculation of inefficiency using LPs is commonly referred to a data envelopment analysis (DEA). IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2008-ECO-2 
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Profit inefficiency in the direction of g  as defined by Chambers et al. (1998) is:  
  { } ( ) sup ( ) ( ) ( ) y x PI x y p w g R w y g p x g p w l l l , , , ; = Î : . + - . + £ P ,   (5) 
 
This measure can be interpreted as the difference between the profit function and the observed profit 





p w w y p x
PI x y p w g
w g p g
P , - . + .
, , , ; =
. - .
  (6) 
 
By  definition,  the  allocative  inefficiency  is  the  difference  between  the  profit  and  the  technical 
inefficiency:  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) T AI x y p w g PI x y p w g D x y g , , , ; = , , , ; - , ;   (7) 
 
The profit inefficiency of a particular firm is defined by  ( )
k k k k k k PI x y p w x y , , , ; , . We first compute 
( )
k k p w P ,  by solving a linear program (8) and then apply equation (6). For example, under the 
assumption of a variable returns to scale technology the linear programming problem to solve is: 
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4. Empirical analysis of farmers’ attitudes to risk 
 
This section first describes the data used, the technology specification and the allocative inefficiency 
scores. The equation linking allocative inefficiency and output price levels to characterize producer 
risk aversion is then econometrically tested. 
 
4.1. Sample description and technology specification 
This study uses farm accountancy figures from an unbalanced panel data related to 650 farms over the 
1992-2003 period. Located in the French Department of Meuse, these farms mainly produce cereals, 
livestock and milk: 41% are specialized cattle and dairy farms, 18% focus on cash crops and 41% are 
mixed. Other outputs yield only marginal revenues. General descriptive statistics of the sample are 
detailed in Table 1.  
 
Farms use on average a total cultivated area of 177 hectares. The sample however contains some 
heterogeneity in size with a standard deviation higher than 80 hectares and an interval of variation of 
671 hectares. Figures are more homogenous over the time period showing a slight increasing size. 
Wheat cultivated area represents around 24% of total surface and follows the same time-trend. The 
average of gross margin attains 744 euros per hectare with an annual growth rate of 4.4%. Some 
annual variations are quite significant especially during the 2003 drought.  
 IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2008-ECO-2 
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Table 1: General Descriptive Statistics (period 1992-2003) 
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Number of observations.  624  647  658  685  662  669  669  657  650  623  614  595 
Total area (hectares)                         
Mean  157  165  172  175  178  178  179  181  181  185  187  189 
Std. Dev.  82  86  89  92  94  95  96  98  97  99  99  101 
Min  47  50  47  44  53  48  48  42  47  40  47  40 
Max  733  720  718  718  718  718  717  717  716  708  708  708 
Wheat area (hectares)                         
Mean  37  35  38  42  44  45  46  42  46  43  45  43 
Std. Dev.  29  26  27  29  30  33  33  34  33  31  32  31 
Min  1.8  1.9  1.5  1.4  2.8  1.7  2.9  1.1  2.3  2.0  0.5  1.8 
Max  307  201  236  208  231  284  316  298  232  235  242  229 
Gross Margin 
(euros/hectare) 
                       
Mean  840  750  781  845  962  700  725  722  650  664  652  634 
Std. Dev.  140  131  117  119  119  101  117  126  124  119  108  127 
Min  331  319  382  346  574  161  260  261  149  241  301  209 
Max  1328  1132  1200  1207  1486  1042  1076  1158  1054  1145  1377  1177 
 
Table 2 presents the data used to estimate the production technology and the profit function. Wheat is 
produced from the following three inputs: 
1.  total expenses in fertilizer by hectare 
2.  total expenses on pesticide by hectare  
3.  total expenses on seeds by hectare  
 
All these input variables are deflated using their respective price indices and expressed in constant 
Euros (year 2000). Wheat price in real terms (euros per quintal deflated by the general price index) is 
also used in the profit function. On average, fertilizer expenses are nearly 126 euros while pesticide 
and seed costs respectively reach 136 euros and 56 euros per hectare. Yield mean gets to 68 quintals 
per hectare. For these four variables, no significant increasing or decreasing trends can be found since 
annual values get around their total period average. Wheat price is around 16 euros per quintal and it 
decreased for the 11 years at an annual rate of 1.5%. Following a phase of downward trend (1992-
1996), the output price volatility
6 among farmers within the same year significantly increased over the 
period 1997-2003. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the production technology and profit function variables 
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Input variables                         
Fertilizer (euros/hectare)                         
Mean  135  117  115  130  144  139  131  121  113  137  123  112 
Std. Dev.  36  33  28  34  34  36  36  37  33  34  30  32 
Min  46  40  47  32  35  57  31  42  42  40  34  46 
Max  260  267  228  262  280  304  304  324  268  269  239  241 
Pesticide (euros/hectare)                         
Mean  137  120  118  136  134  136  147  145  143  148  140  123 
Std. Dev.  37  37  35  38  36  35  36  40  36  39  37  40 
Min  16  2  6  11  28  16  16  14  12  5  13  14 
Max  246  276  276  261  253  242  247  261  281  281  274  319 
Seeds (euros/hectare)                         
Mean  65  62  52  50  56  60  61  64  55  56  50  44 
Std. Dev.  21  21  18  18  21  23  21  29  22  24  20  18 
                                                       
6 Measured by the coefficient of variation (std/mean). IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2008-ECO-2 
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Min  29  9  5  14  18  17  20  18  13  14  13  13 
Max  126  154  123  115  126  129  124  311  146  291  122  183 
                         
Output variables                         
Wheat (quintal/hectare)                         
Mean  66.7  67.7  62.9  65.4  78.5  65.1  73.0  71.8  70.5  64.7  70.2  57.5 
Std. Dev.  7.3  9.0  7.6  7.9  8.5  7.0  9.3  9.4  9.7  9.9  9.1  10.1 
Min  40.0  32.0  32.6  20.3  49.8  43.4  38.3  27.3  26.0  25.3  43.2  30.3 
Max  89.8  89.0  90.6  95.3  113.6  88.6  101.0  94.3  97.3  91.1  93.5  88.2 
 
Wheat Price (euros/quintal) 
                       
Mean  17.7  15.6  17.0  17.8  16.6  15.9  14.6  14.7  13.7  15.6  13.8  16.1 
Std. Dev.  1.0  1.1  0.8  1.0  0.7  0.9  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.3  1.1  1.9 
Min  15.9  11.5  15.0  15.2  13.6  10.5  11.7  10.4  9.1  11.6  11.3  10.2 
Max  24.6  22.5  19.8  28.1  19.7  20.6  19.2  25.7  21.2  28.3  24.2  26.0 
                         
 
4.2. Allocative inefficiency results 
To account for a climatic effect, we estimate a specific variable return to scale technology per year. 
This implicitly integrates this risk into the time dimension of our analysis instead of computing a 
common benchmark on the whole of accumulated sample (650 farms over 12 years). We measured the 
technical inefficiency using the linear program (3). Allocative inefficiency levels are evaluated with 
the linear program (8).  
 
Table 2 presents the allocative inefficiency scores. Over the period, allocative inefficiency reaches 
30%. This implies that farms could improve their wheat gross margin per hectare by about the same 
percentage if their variable input expenditures were adjusted to the observed relative price levels.  
 
Table 3: Allocative inefficiency scores in %  
  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Mean  29.0  23.6  27.8  27.4  38.2  29.1  25.4  36.9  29.0  23.6  27.8  27.4 
Std. Dev.  17.1  15.0  23.1  30.1  33.0  30.6  18.4  36.3  17.1  15.0  23.1  30.1 
 
4.3. Econometric Estimations  
In  section  2,  the  following  relationship  has  been  derived  0 1 ( , , , , ) y x AI f p k p p p = .  Given  that 
homogenous  price  intervals  and  input  prices  were  assumed  among  our  sample,  we  can  omit 
0 1 ( , , ) x p p p  in the specification since they will be captured by the constant in the model. Moreover, 
we complement the equation by farmers’ economic characteristics assumed to lead to variations in risk 
attitude. In the particular case of the simple model developed previously, a quadratic functional form 
was highlighted between  AI  and  y p . As we cannot infer the exact relationship for general concave 
production  technology,  we  adopt  a  flexible  functional  form  in  logarithmic  terms.  We  therefore 
estimate the following equation:  
 
, , , , , ( ) ( )
y y
i t i t i t i t t i i t AI Ln p Ln p X D b g w a m = + + + +  
 
Where  indices  i  and  t  are  respectively  related  to  individuals  and  time.  , i t AI   measures  allocative 
inefficiency,  , ( )
y
i t Ln p  is the achieved price of a quintal of wheat (in logarithm term) and  , i t X is a 
vector of socio-economic variables such as subsidies per hectare of wheat, debt ratio, total assets, 
farmer’s age… Thusg  measures the influence of X on the allocative inefficiency-price slope. Time-
dummy variables Dt are introduced to take account of common year effects. Individuals effects  i a  IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2008-ECO-2 
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allows to capture structural differences among farms and  , i t m  is an usual random term assumed to 
have zero mean and constant variance. Additionally, we assume it to be distributed independently and 
identically across producers and over time.  
 
We retain four variables as having an influence on allocative inefficiency and risk behavior: 
·  Subsidies per hectare of wheat to capture the dependency of the farm on subsidies,  
·  Debt ratio to characterize financial position (measured by total debts on total assets),  
·  Total assets to assess wealth in the farm, 
·  Farmer’s age.  







 is positive in case of risk aversion while components of  ˆ g  can be positive 
or negative with respect to their variables. In the literature, subsidies per hectare and the total assets 
have generally been associated positively with risk taking (see e.g. Shahabuddin et al. 1986). Risk 
aversion is thought to decrease as farmer’ wealth increases and as output activities are more supported 
by agricultural policies. Inversely, we expect a positive effect for the debt ratio. Finally, it is usually 
assumed that younger farmers are more disposed to take risks than older ones (Moscardi and de 
Janvry, 1977).  
 
Since we have panel data, we both estimate the fixed effect model (within estimators) and the random 
effect model (GLS estimators) complemented by the usual Hausman test. This test leads to favor the 
random  effect  model.  As  expected,  a  positive  and  highly  significant  effect  of  output  prices  on 
allocative inefficiency is found at the average point. All other marginal effects have the expected signs 
or  are  not  significant.  Beyond  this  global  analysis,  one  can  also  be  interested  in  comparing  risk 
preferences among different farm types (specialized field crops, specialized cattle and dairy farms or 
mixed). Therefore, we run similar regression for each category. Results are listed in table 4. The main 
result is a significant difference in risk aversion between, on one hand, specialized field crops and 
mixed farms and, on the other hand, specialized cattle and dairy farms. Risk aversion is nearly twice as 
high for the latter group. As a result, it appears that livestock farmers are much risk averse in wheat 
production  which  is  not  in  the  core  of  their  activities.  Marginal  effects  of  subsidies  per  hectare, 
indebtedness and farmer’s age are either non significant or display the anticipated signs. Finally, in 
line with Binswanger’s statistical results (1980), wealth measured by total assets do not affect risk 
aversion.    
 
Table 4: Estimation results for all of farms and for each type of farms 
  Overall  Specialized 
field crops 
Specialized 



























































Ln(price).age  0.0004**  0.00176**  0.0006*  0.0005** IÉSEG Working Paper Series 2008-ECO-2 
 
  15 
(0.0002)  (0.0008)  (0.0003)  (0.0003) 




1381  3196  3176 















Note: ***, **, *: statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard deviations are in 




It has long been suspected that price uncertainty may cause allocative inefficiency in output/input farm 
decisions. So far, most empirical studies have investigated whether farmers allocate their resources 
more efficiently when prices are less random. Beyond this commonly known connection between 
allocative inefficiency and price volatility, our analysis goes one step further by bridging allocative 
inefficiency  and  ex  post  output  price  levels.  A  contribution  of  our  model  is  to  typify  producers 
regarding  their  risk  preferences.  We  further  propose  a  methodological  approach  first  to  estimate 
allocative inefficiency (net of technical inefficiency) and second to test for risk preferences within an 
econometric framework. 
 
Our results strongly suggest that French farmers are risk averse in wheat production. In particular, 
their risk aversion is decreasing with their specialization in this crop activity. As several previous 
empirical  works  have  shown,  we  find a  negative  influence  of  subsidies  on  risk  aversion  while  a 
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